Force Majeure and Unforeseen Change of Circumstances. The Case of Embargoes and Currency Fluctuations (Russian, German and French Approaches) by Ilya Kokorin  & Jeroen van der Weide 
FOrCe MaJeure and unfoREsEEn ChangE of CiRCumsTanCEs.  
ThE CasE of EmbaRgoEs and CuRREnCy fLuCTuaTions  
(Russian, gERman and fREnCh aPPRoaChEs)
ILYA KOKORIN,
Buzko Kokorin Law Firm (St. Petersburg, Russia),
JEROEN VAN DER WEIDE,
Leiden Law School (Leiden, The Netherlands)
Economic and political instability has become a characteristic of many societies around 
the globe. Recent examples revealing the volatility of the current state of affairs include 
the trade restrictions imposed by the Russian Federation in August 2014, and currency 
fluctuations experienced by many countries, including Russia and potentially Greece. In 
this situation, one may wonder whether contract law has a solution to offer to the parties 
affected. Traditionally dominated by the pacta sunt servanda principle, jurisdictions made 
their own choices. This paper analyses approaches adopted by Russian, German and French 
law in response to situations of force majeure (trade embargoes) and unforeseen change of 
circumstances (currency fluctuations). In search for an explanation of each given approach, 
we reviewed historical arguments, as history played a crucial role in the formation of 
German and French responses, though in a completely different way. Whereas Germany, 
heavily affected by the cataclysms of the World Wars, was eager to adopt a lenient view on 
the possibility of the judicial revision of contracts, France never gave up its suspicion of court 
interventions. As legal preferences are often connected with cultural factors, we looked 
at distinct cultural traits of the societies at issue, by using the Hofstede index. We realized 
that there could be compelling cultural reasons why France and Germany are situated 
at opposite poles, while Russia is somewhere in the middle. Lastly, we took into account 
considerations derived from law and economics, arguing that narrowly construed court 
intervention might be economically justified in cases of impossibility and impracticability, 
as ultimately decreasing transaction and risk-appraisal costs.
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1. Introduction
2014 has witnessed great challenges in the world political and economic arenas. 
Constantly falling oil prices and related financial risks, political turbulence in western 
Europe, terrorist attacks in Paris and the war in ukraine have shown that Fukuyama’s 
‘end of history’1 is still a nice theory rather than a true description of the current 
state of affairs. In such difficult times it becomes evident how interrelated the worlds 
of politics and economics are, since only a stable and predictable state policy can 
guarantee a constant flow of investments. In this regard, we see law as being an 
indispensable element of policy, which can either stimulate economic growth or 
facilitate market depression.
In response to sanctions imposed by the Eu, the usA, Japan and several other 
states in the spring and summer of 2014, the russian government, by its decree 
No. 778 of August 7, 2014, imposed a 1-year ban on the imports of a wide range of 
us and European food products, including poultry, beef, pork, fruit, cheese, milk and 
other dairy goods. Notably, the exports of food and raw materials to russia were 
worth €12.2 billion in 2013,2 russia was the Eu’s second-biggest market for food 
exports (10% of total), after the us (13%).3 In light of the above figures, it is hard to 
overestimate the economic impact of the imposed embargo, both for russian and 
European business partners.
1  Francis Fukuyama, the End of history and the Last Man (Free Press 1992), available at <http://www.
social-sciences-and-humanities.com/PdF/the-End-of-history-and-the-Last-Man-.pdf> (accessed 
Jul. 26, 2015).
2  Jennifer rankin, Russia Responds to Sanctions by Banning Western Food Imports, the guardian (Aug. 7, 
2014), <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/07/russia-retaliates-western-sanctions-ban-
food-imports> (accessed Jul. 26, 2015).
3  Russia Hits West with Food Import Ban in Sanctions Row, BBC News (Aug. 7, 2014), <http://www.bbc.
com/news/world-europe-28687172> (accessed Jul. 26, 2015).
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the purpose of this article is to analyse how modern legal systems address 
complex problems arising in cross-border economic turnover: trade sanctions 
(embargoes) and steep currency fluctuations. we will see how russian, german 
and French legal systems have traditionally treated situations of physical and 
legal impossibility, most often referred to as force majeure, and which contractual 
consequences can be claimed in such circumstances. the second part of this 
article will be devoted to a separate legal concept, which is commonly referred 
to as unforeseen change of circumstances or hardship.4 the choice of this topic 
is primarily driven by the rising trend in currency volatility, particularly in oil-
exporting countries. Besides, one does not have to be a prophet to see what drastic 
economic consequences are to follow, should greece leave the Eurozone.5 the case 
of unforeseen change of circumstances is legally distinct from force majeure, as it 
makes contractual performance more onerous, albeit still physically / legally possible. 
Nevertheless, functionally, these two concepts are very similar: they both deal with 
the problem of loss allocation and risk imputation. In the words of Justice holmes, 
‘one who makes a contract never can be absolutely certain that he will be able to 
perform it when the time comes.’6 this premise holds true for any supervening future 
event, including trade restrictions and currency devaluations.
the countries indicated above have been chosen for two main reasons. Firstly, 
taking into account the character of russian sanctions (restriction on import of 
agricultural products), germany and France were potentially among those most 
heavily affected in terms of absolute value.7 therefore, it seems more practical to 
look at these particular jurisdictions, since a hefty number of international sales 
agreements involving sanctioned goods would likely include a party from one 
of them. And secondly, apart from close economic ties, the civil law traditions 
of these countries have a lot in common; they have historically been influenced 
by each other, at least to some degree. All jurisdictions covered in this article, 
to one extent or another, are familiar with concepts of force majeure (physical 
impossibility) and unforeseen change of circumstances (hardship). Moreover, all of 
them are signatories to the uN Convention on Contracts for the International sale of 
4  In this article we might also interchangeably use such terms as ‘impracticability’ and ‘economic 
impossibility.’
5  In its press release of June 29, 2015, the dutch Employers’ organisation for logistics and transport 
(EVo) urged its members to check whether their international contracts are ‘grexit-proof.’ EVo 
recommended that its members renegotiate current agreements with their greek counterparts on 
the basis of an unforeseen change of circumstances. the press release is available at <http://www.
evo.nl/site/zijn-uw-contracten-grexit-proof> (accessed Jul. 26, 2015).
6  Day v. United States, 245 u.s. 159, 161 (1917).
7  For numbers, see susanne kraatz, The Russian Embargo: Impact on the Economic and Employment Situation 
in the EU (october 2014), <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/regdata/etudes/BrIE/2014/536291/IPoL_
BrI(2014)536291_EN.pdf> (accessed Jul. 26, 2015).
ILYA KOKORIN, JEROEN VAN DER WEIDE 49
goods,8 which could give an additional impetus for adopting a unified or, at least, non-
conflicting approach to situations of trade embargoes and currency fluctuations.
there exists an almost universal consensus among the jurisdictions studied that 
contracts shall be performed, an ancient maxim of pacta sunt servanda (agreements 
must be kept). this is one of the major legal principles supporting such values as 
legal certainty and stability of economic relations. however, the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda has never been applied without exception. Even in roman law not 
all contracts were considered binding under all possible circumstances, although 
clausula rebus sic stantibus (a contract is binding only as long and as far as matters 
remain the same as they were at the time of conclusion of the contract) doctrine was 
not known to roman lawyers.9 the relative character of the inviolability of contracts 
has been determined by a coexistence with other important legal norms, such as 
justice, public interest, sanctity of life and private property, good faith and fairness. 
It is not always clear how these norms relate to each other should a conflict arise. 
It is even more interesting to determine the significance and the place of pacta sunt 
servanda theory among these other values. Each legal system developed its own 
set of legal theories and approaches to justify deviation from the strict adherence 
to contracts, as initially agreed upon by the parties.
As noted above, in this article we will deal with three legal systems and their 
treatment of force majeure and unforeseen change of circumstances, in particular. It 
is in this comparative character, that we will try to show the common and divergent 
trends peculiar to the legal traditions in question. It is true that not all of them 
have witnessed such disruptive events as economic sanctions and steep currency 
fluctuations. or, to put it differently, even if they did, the magnitude of such events is 
incomparable. this unique experience can in part elucidate on modern attitudes to 
the concepts of impossibility and impracticability as developed in the jurisdictions 
studied herein. historical arguments, however, present only part of the picture. other 
considerations, including cultural differences (attitude to risk, level of individualism, 
etc.) and economic aspects (cost-benefit analysis) also play an important role. All 
these will be dealt with in the following pages. For cultural analysis we will use the 
hofstede’s cultural dimensions theory,10 which describes the effects of a society’s 
8  u.N. Comm’n on Int’l trade Law, u.N. Convention on Contracts for the International sale of goods, u.N. 
doc. A/CoNF.97/18, u.N. sales No. E.10.V.14 (1980), s. treaty doc. No. 98-9 (1983), 1489 u.N.t.s. 3, 19 
I.L.M. 668 (1980), at <http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/V1056997-CIsg-e-book.
pdf> (accessed Jul. 26, 2015) [hereinafter CIsg]. the concept of force majeure is covered by Art. 79 
therein. the answer to the question whether or not Art. 79 CIsg covers the concept of hardship is still 
a matter of ongoing debate.
9  reinhard Zimmermann, the Law of obligations: roman Foundations of the Civilian tradition 579 
(Clarendon Press 1996).
10  For more information on the hofstede’s cultural dimensions theory, see: <http://geert-hofstede.com/
national-culture.html> (accessed Jul. 26, 2015); geert hofstede et al., Cultures and organizations: 
software of the Mind (3rd ed., Mcgraw-hill 2010). we are aware of the criticism of this theory, but 
believe that if wisely applied, it can make a valuable contribution to the study of law.
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culture on the values of its members. the hofstede’s model consists of six dimensions, 
each indicating independent preferences for one state of affairs over another. such 
preferences include individualism / collectivism, long term orientation / short term 
normative orientation, masculinity / femininity, etc. Each dimension is being assigned 
a country-specific score from 1 to 100, depending on the importance of a given 
value in a given society.
Before we start, it is important to note that it is not the purpose of this article 
to provide a formula or a scheme on how embargoes or currency fluctuations are 
to be treated in russia, germany and France.11 we are not going to answer whether 
force majeure or unforeseen change of circumstances will be effectively embraced by 
courts in light of the recent political and economic events. such an approach would 
most certainly lead to oversimplification and negate the complexities existing within 
the legal systems in question, let alone taken in their comparative overview. despite 
the fact that in many cases application of russian, german or French law will bring 
about the same result, one should always be aware of the persistent theoretical 
differences and the evolving character of laws and legal doctrines, which may have 
practical effects on resolving cases of supervening events.
2. Russian Law Approach: From One Crisis to Another
2.1. Force majeure and Embargoes
Provisions of russian law related to the topic of this article can be found in Arts. 
401 and 417 of the russian Civil Code12 [hereinafter rCC]. Article 401(3) is devoted 
to the issue of liability for violation of contractual obligations and establishes:
unless otherwise stipulated by law or contract, a person acting in 
a commercial setting, who failed to perform an obligation or performed it in 
an improper way . . . shall be liable unless he can prove that due performance 
was impossible because of irresistible force, i.e. extraordinary circumstances, 
which were impossible to avert under the given conditions.
Article 417(1) deals with the termination of obligations and provides for such 
termination in full or in part if, due to an act of a state body or municipal authority, 
performance under the contract has become impossible in full or in part.
It is clear from the above, that: 1) russian law provides for a no-fault or strict 
liability regime in B2B relations; 2) issues of termination of contractual obligations 
11  the inability to develop a coherent positive theory consistent with the typical outcomes in the 
recurrent cases has been recognized by richard Posner. See richard A. Posner & Andrew M. rosenfield, 
Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6(1) J. Legal stud. 83 (1977).
12  the English translation of Parts I, II and III of the russian Civil Code is available at <http://www.russian-
civil-code.com/> (accessed Jul. 26, 2015).
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and liability for non-performance / defective performance are treated separately; 
3) discharge from liability is allowed only if the circumstances preventing performance 
are exceptional and unavoidable.
the first point entails that a party in B2B relations is liable for non-performance 
even in the absence of its fault, unless it can prove the existence of a force majeure 
event, which prevented proper performance. we will get back to the distinction 
between fault and strict liability regimes later on, as we consider german and French 
approaches to impossibility.
As we turn to the second issue raised, we need to point out that the exact 
relationship between Art. 401 (force majeure) and Art. 417 (impossibility of 
performance due to a state act) / Art. 416 (impossibility of performance) is unclear. 
some of the authors believe that the former is an example of the latter.13 In any 
case, the sphere of application of Art. 417 remains uncertain and we were unable 
to find any cases where a court applied this article to situations of trade restrictions. 
other scholars have noticed that Art. 417 was designed for cases of subsequent 
impossibility of performance, provided that such impossibility is permanent.14 due to 
the fact that the majority of state acts and their consequences are ab initio temporal 
(e.g., they are either adopted for a definite period of time or can be revoked in 
the future), it is doubtful whether this article can at all be applied to situations of 
embargoes.
In line with this logic, but characterizing the concept of impossibility as such, 
hüseyin Can Aksoy argues that ‘temporal impossibility is not impossibility in 
the technical sense’ and that ‘the concept of impossibility has a permanent and 
definite nature.’15 we would not be going so far as to deny the application of the 
impossibility doctrine to impediments of temporary nature.16 the only difference 
might be in the result. whereas the continuation of contractual relations in cases 
13  Будылин С.Л. Запрет на импорт: форс-мажор или непредвиденное обстоятельство? [Budylin s.L. 
Zapret na import: fors-mazhor ili nepredvidennoe obstoyatel’stvo? [sergey L. Budylin, Prohibition of Import: 
force majeure or Unforeseen Event?]], Zakon.ru (Aug. 12, 2014), <http://zakon.ru/blog/2014/08/12/
zapret_na_import_forsmazhor_ili_nepredvidennoe_obstoyatelstvo> (accessed Jul. 26, 2015).
14  Комментарий к Гражданскому кодексу Российской Федерации. Часть первая (постатейный) 
[Kommentarii k Grazhdanskomu kodeksu Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Commentary to the Civil Code of the 
russian Federation. Part one (itemized)]] (Aleksander P. sergeev, ed.) (Prospekt 2010); Карапетов А.Г. 
Расторжение нарушенного договора в российском и зарубежном праве [karapetov A.g. 
Rastorzhenie narushennogo dogovora v rossiiskom i zarubezhnom prave [Artem g. karapetov, 
termination of Breached Contract in russian and Foreign Law]] (statut 2007). some of russian courts 
also emphasized that acts mentioned in Art. 417 should lead to an objective and unconditional 
impossibility of preserving future obligations. See, e.g., ruling of the Federal Commercial Court of 
the Far Eastern district of April 29, 2010. Case No. A59-4825/2009.
15  hüseyin C. Aksoy, Impossibility in Modern Private Law: A Comparative study of german, swiss and 
turkish Laws and the unification Instruments 172 (springer 2014).
16  Compare, for instance, with a nuanced approach of german courts to cases of temporal impossibility. 
See infra Ch. 3.
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of permanent impossibility seems illogical, temporal impediments shall not lead 
to automatic and unavoidable termination of contractual obligations. the result-
driven approach allows avoiding a seemingly strained argument that impossibility 
becomes permanent when the date of performance is an essential component of 
the obligation, even though factors causing impossibility are temporal in nature.17 
unilateral termination of a contract under russian law as a general rule is only 
warranted in cases of material breach (Art. 450 rCC), unless otherwise stipulated in 
the contract itself. the longer a temporary impediment exists, the more likely is the 
delay to be characterized as a fundamental breach of the contract.
the situation with the application of Art. 417 has been further complicated by 
the recent amendments to the rCC,18 which now provides that if an act of a state 
body is held void or repealed, the obligation shall not cease, unless otherwise agreed 
by the parties or follows from the nature of the obligation, or if the creditor has not 
refused to perform an obligation within a reasonable time. thus, Art. 417 creates 
a fiction that an obligation never ceased to exist, even though the impediment might 
have appeared indefinite in the first place. In our opinion, this provision creates 
legal uncertainty, as an obligation may cease to exist due to the adoption of a state 
act (outside the sphere of influence of the contracting parties), but then suddenly 
reappear after the state act is held void or is repealed. It is not a usual or normal 
thing to expect that a state act is held void or repealed, especially when adopted for 
a definite period of time. sadly, the new version of Art. 417 also does not clarify its 
application to situations of temporal impossibility. In our view, a better solution (both 
economically and morally, from the perspective of the principle of party autonomy 
in contract law) would be to let the contracting parties decide when contractual 
obligations are to be terminated. In case of a dispute, it would be for the court, 
guided by the considerations of reasonableness and fairness to decide whether 
circumstances of a particular case warrant such termination.
As follows from the wording of Art. 401(3), circumstances preventing performance 
must be exceptional and unavoidable. the russian supreme Commercial Court 
clarified that the exceptional nature of irresistible force (force majeure) entails 
something ‘going beyond the ‘‘normal‘’ and ordinary course, extraordinary for 
a particular life situation . . . which can never be taken into account.’19 the Court further 
emphasized that force majeure has in its substance objective, and not subjective 
unavoidability. For instance, the Court refused to consider fire a force majeure event 
since the objective criteria of unavoidability were not satisfied, i.e. the number of fire 
fighters involved, being a subjective criterion, was relevant in preventing fire from 
17  Aksoy, supra n. 15, at 172.
18  Introduced by the Federal Law No. 42-FZ of March 8, 2015, which entered into force on July 1, 2015.
19  ruling of the Presidium of the supreme Commercial Court of the russian Federation of June 21, 2012. 
Case No. А40-25926/2011-13-230.
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damaging the property.20 so when the consequences of a supervening event are 
capable of being mitigated or prevented by the parties concerned (e.g., by sending an 
additional number of fire fighters to the fire scene), such an event would not release 
a debtor from its liability. the criterion of objectivity will not play an important role 
in case of embargoes, when the illegality of performance is indisputable and cannot 
be changed by the parties.
the russian supreme Court highlighted that supervening events should also be 
objectively unforeseeable.21 this last element of the force majeure test turns out to 
be the most problematic, when it comes to state acts and currency fluctuations. For 
example, in a recent case the court refused to treat the temporary restriction on the 
import of live animals from the Eu imposed in March 2012 as a force majeure event. 
the court argued that such restrictions were not unique and could have been found 
in the past. In particular, the information on such previous restrictions in this case 
was publicly available on the website of the russian Federal service for Veterinary 
and Phytosanitary surveillance (Rosselkhoznadzor).22 this is, in our view, a rather far-
reaching conclusion, effectively depriving parties of force majeure defence in all or 
nearly all cases of state-issued export or import bans.
It is hard to justify such a strict approach on the basis of risk of loss that every 
contracting party should be deemed to have assumed (‘commercial risk’), since 
particular types of embargoes (embargoes imposed on a particular product from 
a particular country) are almost impossible to predict, unless one has supernatural 
powers. this is why in this case ‘allocation of the risk to one or the other party cannot 
operate as an incentive for the party to invest in order to reduce such a risk.’23 though 
the statement that ‘there is nothing new under the sun’ may hold true, the mere 
fact that restrictive measures such as trade bans were imposed in the past does 
not, in our view, create a sufficient level of foreseeability.24 the court’s logic is a good 
example of the hindsight bias, signifying an inclination to consider an event as being 
predictable, after the event has occurred, despite little or no objective basis for 
predicting it. transaction costs of negotiating the allocation of all possible risks in 
20  ruling of the Presidium of the supreme Commercial Court of the russian Federation, supra n. 19.
21  decision of the supreme Court of the russian Federation of March 14, 2012. Case No. AkPI12-69.
22  ruling of the Federal Commercial Court of the North-western district of June 27, 2014. Case No. А21-
8837/2012.
23  unexpected Circumstances in European Contract Law 49 (Ewoud hondius & hans C. grigoleit, 
eds.) (Cambridge university Press 2011).
24  restrictions on the import of various categories of food products have regularly been imposed by the 
russian Federal service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary surveillance. For instance, such embargoes 
concerned pork and pigs (Letter No. Fs-ggVI/7340 of July 17, 2009), poultry, hatching eggs, down 
and feather (Letter No. Fs-NV-2/510 of January 25, 2010), fruits (apple, pear, cherry, apricot, plum, 
etc.) (Letter No. Fs-As-3/13028 of July 18, 2014), alcoholic drinks (cognac, wine (including sparkling 
wine)) (Letter of the Chief state sanitary doctor No. 0100/3835-06-23 of April 4, 2006).
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situations where the occurrence of a risk is remote and largely improbable, if we take 
together all relevant transactions, might overweigh post-contractual loss multiplied 
by the probability of such a loss. the result so achieved will be the net welfare loss. 
this situation would certainly contravene the purpose of the law to ‘reduce the costs 
of contract negotiation by supplying contract terms that the parties would probably 
have adopted explicitly had they negotiated over them.’25
It appears to be a different scenario when a party has or should reasonably have 
knowledge about the proposed embargo, as in the case of public discussions of 
a respective bill or draft government decree, or when the unforeseen regulation 
entered into force after a due date for performance of a contractual obligation.26 the 
force majeure argument will also fail in situations when state acts have a secondary 
or accidental effect on contractual relations, i.e. they are not the primary cause 
of impossibility (legal or factual) to perform.27 the courts would equally refuse to 
release a party from its liability when the performance is technically possible, e.g. 
by contracting with new suppliers residing in countries outside the sanctions list,28 
or by using rented premises for purposes of storing food coming from non-sanction 
countries, even if such were primarily used for storage of the sanctioned goods 
before.29
the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the rF Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry [hereinafter ICAC] has also shown reluctance in accepting the force 
majeure argument in cases concerning state-imposed impediments. For instance, 
the ICAC refused to consider a ban on international currency transfers imposed by 
the Central Bank of russia in 1998 as force majeure.30 In that case an Italian company 
(seller) claimed the purchase price from a russian company (buyer) for the goods 
delivered under the contract. the buyer argued that he had made payment orders to 
the russian bank, which was unable to effect the transfer due to the above ban. while 
refusing to release the buyer from contractual liability, the tribunal argued that the 
failure to perform contractual obligations was caused by a third party, namely the 
russian bank, and that the defendant failed to prove that such third party, if sued, 
25  Posner & rosenfield, supra n. 11, at 88.
26  ruling of the Federal Commercial Court of the North-western district of June 4, 2007. Case No. А21-
4850/2006.
27  For instance, in a number of judgments russian courts refused to consider the economic crises of 
1998 and 2008 as force majeure events, arguing that mere financial difficulties fall within the assumed 
commercial risks inherent to business activity. See: ruling of the Federal Commercial Court of the 
North-western district of April 17, 2001. Case No. 4327; ruling of the Fifteenth Appellate Commercial 
Court of April 26, 2010. Case No. A53-18991/2009; ruling of the Ninth Appellate Commercial Court 
of March 15, 2010. Case No. 91450/2009.
28  decision of the Commercial Court of the City of Moscow of April 2, 2015. Case No. A40-209173/14.
29  ruling of the thirteenth Appellate Commercial Court of May 29, 2015. Case No. А56-71546/2014.
30  Award of the ICAC at the rF CCI of July 30, 2001. Case No. 198/2000.
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would have been exempt from liability.31 the absurdity of this argument is evident 
from the fact that in the case at hand currency transfers were not allowed, regardless 
of bank involvement.
the jurisprudence cited above reveals the unwillingness of russian courts and 
some arbitration tribunals to admit the applicability of force majeure defence in 
cases related to state conduct. this conclusion goes in line with the findings of 
other scholars.32 therefore, it is well advised to allocate all risks related to state 
actions and temporary export and import bans, in particular, by using contractual 
arrangements. only those circumstances which fall under the legal definition of 
force majeure, sensu stricto, will be treated as such.33 this, however, shall not prevent 
parties from agreeing on the consequences of certain events, whether referred to as 
force majeure or not.34 After all, Art. 401(3) rCC has a dispositive character and may 
be departed from. however, while balancing contractual risks and allocating liability, 
one should keep in mind that liability for intentional breach of contract cannot be 
limited (Art. 401(4) rCC), just like in german and French law. other restraints of 
contractual freedoms could stem from consumer protection laws and other specific 
legislation.
2.2. Economic Instability and Currency Fluctuations
so far, we have looked at the issue of trade restrictions and the applicability 
of force majeure rhetoric with relation to such state actions. Now we will turn to 
another topical subject, namely currency fluctuations. the swiss franc jumped by 
30% in a matter of minutes in January 2015. during 2014, the russian rouble fell by 
40% against the dollar, while the Canadian and Australian dollar have recently both 
dropped to six-year lows against the us dollar.35 the question arises whether such 
economic processes could have any contractual effect in agreements where the 
31  the tribunal decided the case on the basis of CIsg. Nevertheless, the case is relevant, since russia is 
a signatory to CIsg and the wording of Art. 79 is similar to Art. 401 rCC.
32  schlechtriem & schwenzer: Commentary on the uN Convention on the International sale of goods 
(CIsg) 1071 (Ingeborg schwenzer, ed.) (3rd ed., oxford university Press 2010); Николюкин С.В. 
Основания оcвобождения от ответственности в практике международного коммерческого 
арбитража // Право и экономика. 2009. № 5. C. 96–101 [Nikolyukin s.V. Osnovaniya osvobozhdeniya 
ot otvetstvennosti v praktike mezhdunarodnogo kommercheskogo arbitrazha // Pravo i ekonomika. 2009. 
No. 5. s. 96–101 [stanislav V. Nikolyukin, Grounds for Release from Liability in Case Law of International 
Commercial Arbitration, 2009(5) Law and Economics 96–101]].
33  For instance, in a recent ruling, dated April 21, 2015 (Case No. A43-28160/2014), the Commercial Court 
of Nizhny Novgorod region held that ‘extension of the list of events capable of relieving a party from 
liability for non-performance is prohibited by Art. 401 rCC, which sets out that force majeure shall 
presuppose events which are extraordinary and unavoidable.’
34  Amendments to the rCC introduced by the Federal Law No. 42-FZ of March 8, 2015, explicitly allow parties 
in B2B transactions to agree on the compensation of losses caused by impossibility (Art. 406(1) rCC).
35  Why Currency Volatility Has Got Worse, the Economist (Feb. 3, 2015), <http://www.economist.com/
blogs/economist-explains/2015/02/economist-explains-2> (accessed Jul. 26, 2015).
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price is set in foreign currency, e.g., in releasing a defaulting party from its liability 
or allowing for a change in contractual terms through judicial means.
russian legislation generally allows a contract to be terminated or amended 
in court, should the circumstances in which the contract was made have changed 
materially (Art. 451 rCC).36 Apart from the fundamental character of change, in order 
to rely on this article, a debtor will have to prove that the change of circumstances 
was insurmountable, unforeseeable and external to the parties. these turn out to be 
a high threshold to pass. some of the commentators even noted that for the whole 
period of the rCC’s existence, there has only been one event recognized by courts 
as satisfying the criteria of Art. 451, namely the default of 1998.37 As we will show 
below, even the economic crisis, which hit russia in the second half of the 1990s, 
was hardly considered as an unforeseen change of circumstances.
In times of economic turmoil, parties often attempt to enhance their position by 
claiming that the contract should be brought to an end or amended in their favour. 
however, as we pointed out above, the respected claim may only be successful 
when the change of circumstances is unforeseeable, the requirement similar to the 
one attributable to force majeure. unlike trade bans, however, currency fluctuations 
are a characteristic element of the world economy. they are ‘a natural outcome of 
the floating exchange rate system that is the norm for most major economies.’38 
Accepting this argumentation, russian courts do not consider devaluation of 
a national currency as valid ground for terminating or amending a contract under 
the above material change of circumstances doctrine.39 In one of the decisions, 
while noting a general economic volatility of russia, the court summed up that 
the conclusion of a loan agreement, regardless of whether it was made in a foreign 
36  despite the fact that Art. 451(4) rCC provides that an agreement may be amended only in exceptional 
circumstances, while the termination is a general rule, in practice courts almost equally terminate and revise 
contracts. See Петрищев В.С. Существенное изменение обстоятельств: правоприменение ст. 451 
ГК РФ и опыт стран общего и континентального права: Препринт  wP10/2007/06 [Petrishchev V.s. 
Sushchestvennoe izmenenie obstoyatel’stv: pravoprimenenie st. 451 GK RF i opyt stran obshchego 
i kontinental’nogo prava: Preprint WP10/2007/06 [Vadim s. Petrishchev, A Fundamental Change of 
Circumstances: the Practice of Application of the Art. 451 of the Civil Code of the russian Federation 
and the Legal Experience of the Common and Continental Law Countries: Preprint wP10/2007/06]] 32 
(higher school of Economics 2007), available at <https://www.hse.ru/data/2010/05/06/1216457923/
wP10_2007_06.pdf> (accessed Jul. 26, 2015).
37  Брагинский М.И, Витрянский В.В. Договорное право. Книга пятая. В двух томах. Т. 1 [Braginsky M.I., 
Vitryansky V.V. Dogovornoe pravo. Kniga pyataya. V dvukh tomakh. T. 1 [Mikhail I. Braginsky & Vasily V. 
Vitryansky, Contract Law. 1 Book Five]] (statut 2006).
38  The Effects of Currency Fluctuations on the Economy, Investopedia (Aug. 8, 2013), <http://www.
investopedia.com/articles/forex/080613/effects-currency-fluctuations-economy.asp> (accessed 
Jul. 26, 2015).
39  See: ruling of the Federal Commercial Court of the Moscow district of January 4, 2001. Case 
No. Кg-А40/6004-00; decision of the supreme Commercial Court of the russian Fedration of April 28, 
2007. Case No. А75-2991/2006.
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currency or in roubles entails the risk of changing circumstances. this, as the court 
argued, was derived from the constant inflation processes.40
this unwillingness of the russian judiciary to consider currency fluctuations as 
a ground for termination or revision of contracts might have its cultural explanations. 
According to the hofstede's index, russian society is extremely risk-averse (score 95 in 
uncertainty avoidance) and prefers certainty and predictability. this explains a complex 
bureaucratic system, existing in russia from time immemorial.41 this also accounts for 
the rigid interpretation and application of laws and regulations. As a matter of fact, 
what could be more stable than limited intervention or better, no intervention at all? 
Based on the same index, the russian approach to unforeseen change of circumstances 
may also have its backing in the long term orientation (81), signalling a pragmatic 
mind-set. Allowing Art. 451 rCC defence in the aftermath of the 1998 crisis could 
have had a tremendous effect on the russian economy, undermining performance of 
hundreds or possibly thousands of contracts. Lastly, low scores for masculinity (36) and 
indulgence (20) indicate a pessimistic view of the present and future. No wonder 
economic instability is seen as something indispensable and ‘normal.’
It is true that changing currency exchange rates are characteristic of international 
economic turnover. however, we would not go as far as to claim that any degree of 
change represents a normal or ordinary situation. the issue of foreseeability should be 
considered in light of the degree of currency volatility and previous economic history 
of a particular country. we assume that there might be situations in which a jump in 
currency exchange rates or inflation would be so drastic and unexpected that the 
considerations of justice, fairness and good faith might require the adjustment or 
termination of a contract. recent amendments to the rCC elevated the principle of 
good faith to the level of general principles of contract law (Art. 1(3) rCC). According 
to this principle, the parties to a contract shall act not only in line with the law and 
contractual provisions, but also in accordance with the principles of good faith 
and fair dealing. they should also provide the necessary assistance to achieve the 
purpose of the contract (Art. 307(3) rCC). we believe that good faith could be used 
as a legal ground for restoring the shattered contractual equilibrium in cases of 
unforeseen change of circumstances. we will turn to this issue in the next chapter 
looking at the german response to the post-world war I economic debacle. the 
difficulty would naturally lie in determining where the line for court intervention 
has to be drawn.42 For instance, the depreciation in the value of national currency 
40  ruling of the Federal Commercial Court of the west-siberian district of January 11, 2007. Case No. F04-
8719/2006.
41  It has been noted that bureaucratic behavior is notoriously risk averse. See Niklas Luhmann, risk: 
A sociological theory 190 (rhodes Barret, trans.) (de gruyter 1993).
42  For instance, schwenzer argues that in international contracts a price increase or decrease mandating 
adjustment or termination of a contract shall be 150–200%. See Ingeborg schwenzer, Force Majeure 
and Hardship in International Contracts, 39 Vict. u. wellington L. rev. 709, 717 (2008), available at 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/nz/journals/VuwLawrw/2008/39.pdf> (accessed Jul. 26, 2015).
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in russia or France has never reached such depths as in germany during the 1920s 
or 1930s. we can only speculate whether the magnitude of the possible economic 
consequences could have changed the russian approach.
As a separate note, we believe that consumer loans in foreign currency may 
dictate a more nuanced approach, specifically in a setup where a bank induces the 
conclusion of a loan agreement, by advertising it or emphasizing the stability of 
exchange rates.43 In a recent case,44 a court ordered a bank to recalculate the amount 
to be paid back under the loan agreement made in usd, based on a fixed currency 
rate, twice as low as the current usd to ruB exchange rate. In doing so, the court took 
into account the status of the parties involved (on the one hand, a consumer having 
no prior knowledge of the financial markets and a professional credit institution, 
on the other), the fact that it was a mortgage loan, the behaviour of the bank 
(consultations confirming the stability of the exchange rate),45 unfair contractual 
provisions related to risk allocation and reduction of negative consequences. 
Notably, the court characterized the situation of a steep drop in the value of the 
russian currency as a force majeure event, relieving the non-performing party of any 
penalties. this is rather strange, bearing in mind that force majeure under russian 
law requires impossibility of performance, physical or legal.
In any case, court interference in the area of contractual relations should be 
limited, be it B2B or B2C transactions. Even in situations of consumer loan agreements 
in foreign currency, caution must be paid so as not to encourage ill-judged consumer 
behaviour. the recalculation of loans could also have a bearing on the economic 
balance in the banking industry as a whole, because the risks related to loans in 
foreign currency would ultimately be shifted to other consumers, e.g., in the form 
of increased interest rates.
Ewoud hondius and hans Christoph grigoleit have divided the European jurisdictions 
into two categories: ‘closed’ and ‘open’ regimes. Legal systems with an established 
general doctrine, specifically addressing the issue of unexpected circumstances, 
that can lead to an adjustment of contracts are referred to as ‘open’ (germany, the 
Netherlands, spain, etc.). Conversely, ‘closed’ systems (Belgium, England, France, 
etc.) either lack a general exceptional remedy addressing unforeseen circumstances 
or, even if the respective doctrine exists, it cannot lead to contractual adaptation, as 
a general rule.46 As we have shown above, russia would probably fit into the category 
43  ruling of the Presidium of Belgorod regional Court of March 28, 2013. Case No. g-44-17.
44  decision of the Pushkin City Court of Moscow region of February 4, 2015. Case No. 2-878/2015. this 
decision has been overruled by the Moscow region Court, whose ruling is not yet available.
45  False assurances related to future currency exchange rates given by the bank to a consumer may be 
regarded as misrepresentation. this, according to Art. 431(2) rCC, shall entitle the consumer to claim 
damages arising out of such misrepresentation.
46  Ewoud hondius & hans C. grigoleit, Introduction: An Approach to the Issues and Doctrines Relating to 
Unexpected Circumstances, in unexpected Circumstances in European Contract Law, supra n. 23, at 3, 11.
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of ‘open’ jurisdictions, from the purely doctrinal point of view. It clearly provides for 
termination or adjustment of contracts in cases of unforeseen circumstances (Art. 451 
rCC). At a closer look, however, it is clear that the russian judiciary is rather reluctant 
to grant relief in situations of unexpected circumstances. Notably, the same holds true 
for the restrictive application of the force majeure doctrine.
3. German Law Approach: Complexity and Flexibility
3.1. Force majeure and Trade Restrictions
unlike the russian system of civil liability, which as a general rule accepts strict 
liability in business relations (Art. 401(3) rCC), german law is characterized by the 
principle of fault (Verschuldensprinzip).47 Liability for a failure to perform contractual 
obligations would require at least negligence on the side of the performing party.48 
A person is considered as acting negligently if he fails to exercise reasonable care, 
§ 276(2) of the german Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch)49 [hereinafter BgB]. 
therefore, situations of unavoidable and extrinsic events rendering performance 
of a contract impossible would usually not require special treatment and reference 
to specific legal provisions related to force majeure.
Import and export restrictions can be seen as developments creating legal 
impossibility (rechtliche Unmöglichkeit) to perform under a sales agreement. As 
opposed to absolute (physical) impossibility, delivery of goods remains possible, 
since such goods are available on the international market. however, trade bans 
imposed by public authorities render such performance illegal, thus creating 
objective impossibility whereas neither the debtor nor anybody else is able to 
perform. we presume that no one can be obliged or expected to break the law, even 
if punishment does not follow, as for instance, in the case where trade restrictions 
are not enforced by the authorities.
In addition to the doctrine of fault liability, § 275(1) BgB directly provides that 
‘[a] claim for performance is excluded to the extent that performance is impossible for 
the obligor or for any other person.’ As follows from the above provision, impossibility 
of performance relieves the party from the claim of specific performance, regardless 
whether impossibility is caused by such a party. For the purposes of applying 
§ 275(1) BgB it is also irrelevant whether impossibility is initial or subsequent, 
objective or subjective, partial or total.50 similar to russian law, application of german 
47  Philip ridder & Marc-Philippe weller, Unforeseen Circumstances, Hardship, Impossibility and Force 
Majeure under German Contract Law, 22 European review of Private Law 371, 373 (2014); wolfgang 
Fikentscher & Andreas heinemann, schuldrecht 320 (10th ed., de gruyter 2006).
48  ridder & weller, supra n. 47, at 373.
49  English version of the german Civil Code is available at <http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_
bgb/> (accessed Jul. 26, 2015).
50  Fikentscher & heinemann, supra n. 47, at 188; das neue schuldrecht 108 (Barbara dauner-Lieb et. al., 
eds.) (C.F. Müller 2002); Peter schlechtriem, schuldrecht: Allgemeiner teil 151 (Mohr siebeck 2003).
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law does not lead to automatic termination of the contract – the contract remains 
valid.51 Its enforcement, however, could not be mandated. the debtor remains liable, 
unless he can prove that he is not responsible for the impediment or that he could 
not have known about it, in case of initial impossibility (§ 280, § 311a BgB).
driven by the considerations of good faith, german law protects the defaulting 
party from contractual liability, provided that certain conditions are satisfied. At the 
same time, obligations deriving from the contract are kept in force and the contract 
remains valid and binding upon the parties. this rule ensures security of commercial 
dealings, as the non-defaulting party might still be interested in keeping contractual 
relations alive, even though performance of the contract might temporarily become 
impossible.52 In case of impossibility of performance, the creditor is entitled to 
unilaterally revoke the contract, without the need of providing additional time 
for performance (Nachfrist) (§ 326(5) BgB).53 the creditor’s right to terminate the 
contract is not affected by the nature of the impossibility and whether the debtor 
is in any way responsible for the impediment.54
the question arises whether temporary impossibility of performance, such as in 
case of most trade restrictions, always mandates termination of the contract by the 
creditor. we could think of situations where such a termination could be unjust and 
lead to disproportionate losses on the side of the debtor. such losses may take form not 
only in damages to be paid under § 280 BgB (in case the debtor knew or should have 
known about the proposed trade ban), but also preparation and delivery costs. there 
is no special provision in the BgB addressing the issue of temporal impossibility.
In practice, german courts take a nuanced approach, analysing all relevant facts 
of a particular case and balancing parties’ mutual interests.55 A creditor does not 
always have a right to terminate an agreement due to a delay in performance, caused 
by temporal impossibility. this is especially so when time is of no essence. on the 
flipside, even if the impossibility is temporal in nature, it can nevertheless be equated 
with a permanent impossibility, if it is not foreseeable whether or when a particular 
impediment will cease to exist.56 temporal impossibility is also treated as permanent 
51  unexpected Circumstances in European Contract Law, supra n. 23, at 58.
52  the BgB does not make a distinction between absolute impossibility of performance, e.g. when 
a specific thing to be delivered under the contract is destroyed, and temporal impossibility, e.g. when 
importation of goods is temporarily restricted. See Fikentscher & heinemann, supra n. 47, at 191.
53  similar mechanisms can be found in other jurisdictions, such as the Netherlands. See Art. 6:81 of 
the dutch Civil Code, at <http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/civilcodebook066.htm> (accessed Jul. 26, 
2015).
54  Basil s. Markesinis et al., the german Law of Contract: A Comparative treatise 407 (2nd ed., hart Pub. 2006).
55  See also Peter Mazzacano, The Treatment of CISG Article 79 in German Courts: Halting the Homeward 
Trend, 2012(2) Nordic Journal of Commercial Law, available at <http://njcl.fi/2_2012/mazzacano_
peter.pdf> (accessed Jul. 26, 2015).
56  Christoph Brunner, Force Majeure and hardship under general Contract Principles: Exemption for 
Non-Performance in International Arbitration 251 (kluwer Law International 2009).
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if the achievement of the contractual purpose is called into question by such an 
impediment,57 i.e. when time is of the essence. thus, the german legal system, more 
so than the russian one, considers legitimate interests of a creditor and debtor in 
determining whether impossibility mandates termination of the agreement. As we 
argued before, trade bans are usually imposed for a definite period of time, as in the 
case of the recent russian embargoes. however, they could be either prolonged 
or revoked ahead of time, depending on the current political and economic 
situation. taking this elusive nature of trade restrictions, we believe that a case-by-
case approach to the issue of termination of contractual relations is well justified.
the second question that we need to address is under which conditions mandatory 
rules prohibiting contractual performance (e.g., imposition of trade bans) may excuse 
non-performance. As we pointed out above, impossibility under § 275(1) BgB 
corresponds to real impossibility, but also includes legal impossibility.58 this means 
that the debtor cannot overcome the impediment by any legal means. In this respect, 
the russian and german approaches are similar as the economic impossibility 
(hardship) does not fall under the general concept of force majeure. however, there 
are some important differences to be highlighted. under russian law, force majeure 
is characterized by such elements as unavoidability, unforeseeability, extraordinary 
and objective nature. german law and § 275(1) BgB, in particular, does not make 
a distinction between objective and subjective impossibility, impossibility caused 
by the debtor or independent impossibility, initial or subsequent impossibility.59 For 
the purposes of this article we will review only the initial-subsequent impossibility 
and the related issue of foreseeability.60
Initial impossibility exists when the impeding factor is present at the time of 
contract formation. Importantly, initial impossibility does not affect the validity 
of a contract, which remains fully effective (§ 311a(1) BgB), even though specific 
performance is barred.61 regardless whether impossibility is initial or subsequent, 
the debtor is liable in damages, unless he can prove that he was not aware of the 
obstacles to performance when entering into the contract and that the lack of 
57 Brunner, supra n. 56, at 252.
58  Fikentscher & heinemann, supra n. 47, at 197.
59  Aksoy, supra n. 15, at 11.
60  our decision is based on the presumption that, most of the time, embargoes lead to objective 
impossibility (impossibility for all and not just for the debtor), which is independent of the debtor 
(the debtor does not cause trade restrictions and cannot stop them). thus, the most relevant 
elements to be compared are the time of occurrence of the impediment (prior or after conclusion of 
a contract) and foreseeability (whether imposition of trade restrictions was foreseeable at the time 
of conclusion of a contract).
61  this was different under the former law, which considered initial impossibility a ground for holding 
a contract void, following the roman maxim impossibilium nulla est (of things simply impossible 
completely and physically, there is no obligation).
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awareness was not imputable to him (§ 311a(2) BgB). In other words, liability is fault 
dependent, while fault is presumed. In order to avoid liability the debtor has to show 
that he did not know and should not have known of the existing impediment. this is 
logical and economically justified, as the debtor is usually in a better position to know 
and explain circumstances, which prevented him from performing accordingly.62 
In other words, the debtor would usually be a superior risk-bearer. In cases of 
embargoes, when the text of the legal act imposing trade restrictions was made 
public in line with the applicable rules, in B2B transactions63 there should be an 
irrefutable presumption of such knowledge. russian law would follow the same 
logic, even more so due to the application of the no-fault liability regime.
the situation gets more complicated as we move from initial impossibility 
to a subsequent one, in which the obstacle to performance appears after the 
contract is concluded. It has been stressed in the literature that in case of 
subsequent impossibility, ‘fault is determined in relation to whether the promisor 
is responsible for the impediment to performance,’64 and not whether he knew or 
should have known of such an impediment. It goes without saying that normally 
state-imposed embargoes are independent of the will of the debtor, and thus 
cannot be attributed to him. But what if the plans for adopting trade restrictions 
are announced prior to the conclusion of the contract, so that such restrictions 
could have been foreseen at the time of the conclusion? we have shown above 
that in this case, even in the absence of specific information on the proposed 
state course of action but merely considering prior history of trade bans, russian 
courts might be willing to accept the foreseeability of embargoes and thus deny 
the force majeure defence.
german law does not explicitly state the requirement of unforeseeability. however, 
it can be inferred from the doctrine of initial impossibility, because the debtor has to 
inquire whether he is actually capable of performing the contract before he enters 
into it. If it is well known that the trade embargo will be imposed during the term 
of the contract, thus impeding its execution, considerations of good faith and risk 
allocation dictate that the debtor bears full responsibility for non-performance. 
It seems irrelevant that at the time of entering into a contract there are no trade 
restrictions in place, as long as it is sufficiently certain that contractual performance 
will be barred in the future. It can be argued that foreseeable obstacles are presumed 
62  An interesting scenario is when either the creditor or both parties are (or should be) aware of 
a situation of initial impossibility at the time of entering into the contract. In such a case it seems 
unfair to impute all the blame on the debtor. we think that this situation can be characterized as 
contributory negligence. therefore, liability of the defaulting party should be reduced, or eliminated 
at all, since the creditor could not have reasonably believed that the debtor would be able to perform 
the contract. there is no breach of the promise to perform as such.
63  we assume that B2B transactions are most affected by trade restrictions.
64  Markesinis et al., supra n. 54, at 485.
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to be included in the equilibrium of the contract at the time of its formation. the most 
problematic issue is the level of precision of a future event, i.e. embargo, required 
for imputation of risks to the debtor. In our view, in B2B transactions, in case of 
threatened trade restrictions,65 parties should adjust their contractual relations 
accordingly. this, however, does not go as far as to accept the logic that previously 
imposed periodic trade bans make all future embargoes foreseeable, as this would 
make the whole concept of initial impossibility meaningless. Moreover, it would 
substantially increase transaction costs related to the parties taking precautionary 
measures for risks, which are neither envisaged nor avoidable.
3.2. Currency Depreciation, Lessons from History
Now we will turn to the issue of currency fluctuations. As we have shown above, 
§ 275(1) BgB only deals with factual impossibility (impossibility sensu stricto). Cases 
of economic impossibility (hardship), i.e. when performance becomes excessively 
burdensome, but still possible, have to be addressed with reference to § 275(2) or 
§ 313 BgB. the exact relations between the two are not always clear as both of them 
deal with the situation of increased onerousness of the performance.66
section 275(2) BgB permits the debtor to refuse performance if, and as long as such 
performance requires expenses and effort which, taking into account the subject matter 
of the obligation and the requirements of good faith, are grossly disproportionate to 
the interest in performance of the creditor. It has been argued that the prevention of 
extreme cases of waste of resources is the macroeconomic goal of § 275(2) BgB and 
that the criterion of reasonability is examined in a cost-utility-analysis.67 therefore, it 
is the creditor’s interest in obtaining performance that is decisive in the application of 
§ 275(2) BgB. so long as this interest remains constant or changes to an insignificant 
extent while the debtor’s obligation becomes grossly burdensome, the debtor shall 
be entitled to invoke impossibility as a defence / plea (Einrede).68
we will not go deep into analysing various facets in the application of § 275(2) BgB, 
because we believe it to be inapplicable to situations of currency fluctuations. the 
reason being that market fluctuations (e.g., price and currency changes) affect 
interests of both creditors and debtors, so that performance under the contract 
does not become grossly inefficient. For instance, a fall in the value of national 
65  this has to be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the clarity of public statements, 
official position of a person making statement, likelihood of imposition of trade restrictions, etc.
66  Fikentscher & heinemann, supra n. 47, at 200. According to german legal doctrine, § 275 BgB has 
priority over § 313 BgB; when § 275 BgB and § 313 BgB are both potentially applicable, one should 
apply § 275 BgB.
67  hannes rösler, Hardship in German Codified Private Law – In Comparative Perspective to English, French 
and International Contract Law, 15 European review of Private Law 483, 494 (2007), available at <http://
papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1154004> (accessed Jul. 26, 2015).
68  Markesinis et al., supra n. 54, at 413.
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currency may have a negative impact on the local producer,69 whose production has 
become more onerous due to the fact that the component parts or raw materials 
are being delivered from abroad and thus paid at prices fixed in foreign currency, 
while the revenue is received in the denominated currency. Meanwhile, a buyer 
who entered into a contract with such a producer may win from the currency drop. 
the reason being that the local market would sooner or later react by raising prices 
(as happened after the rouble depreciation), so that the buyer would not be able 
to enter into a new contract for the same ‘bargain’ price, as before the fall. general 
market conditions will be different.
the cases of hyperinflation and dramatic currency fluctuations are not unfamiliar 
to germany. In the aftermath of the world war I, the purchasing power of the german 
currency fell by 80%.70 At the end of 1921, prices were 35 times higher than before 
the war. A year later they had risen to a level that was 1,457 times higher.71 In light 
of such unprecedented economic developments, the pacta sunt servanda principle 
traditionally praised by german judiciary could no longer provide an adequate 
solution to the problem felt by the society as a whole. No longer could risk be 
regarded as being assumed by transacting parties, as in the words of Professor 
dawson, ‘it was another thing to require that [a party] bear the risk of blind and 
capricious changes in the purchasing power of money.’72
reacting to these catastrophic events and taking a largely political decision, 
german courts first applied § 275(1) BgB by terminating the imbalanced contracts. 
It soon, however, became clear that the termination of contracts affected by 
unreasonable and unforeseeable hardship went too far and could have had disastrous 
economic consequences. Indeed, a one-sided and blunt breakdown of commercial 
relations would be inconsistent with the need for the equitable distribution of 
currency risks. Instead, the german Reichsgericht started applying the concept of 
a ‘disturbance of the foundation of the transaction’ (Störung der Geschäftsgrundlage), 
which at that time was based on § 242 BgB – the rule of good faith.73 the court 
authorized the revalorization or adjustment of the contract price, noting, however, 
69  or for that matter anyone else whose income is calculated in the depreciated national currency, e.g. 
borrower, who receives income in the national currency different from the currency of the loan.
70  rösler, supra n. 67, at 491.
71  Id. at 487.
72  John P. dawson, Effects of Inflation on Private Contracts: Germany, 1914–1924, 33(2) Mich. L. rev. 191 
(1934).
73  Before embracing the good-faith doctrine, some of the courts in germany endeavored to ascertain the 
parties’ initial intention and determine the ‘implied’ terms of the contract. the theory of ‘implied’ terms 
was used to discharge a party of an obligation, whose implementation subsequently turns out to be 
extremely burdensome. See Mahmoud r. Firoozmand, Changed Circumstances and Immutability of 
Contract: A Comparative Analysis of Force Majeure and Related Doctrines, 8(2) Bus. L. Int’l 171 (2007). on 
the Störung der Geschäftsgrundlage doctrine, see also Fikentscher & heinemann, supra n. 47, § 27.
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that ‘the fact alone that a subsequent change in the conditions is not foreseeable and 
could not be foreseen does not suffice.’74 what is really required is ‘such a fundamental 
and radical change in the relevant circumstances that it would be an intolerable 
result, quite inconsistent with law and justice, to hold the party to the contract.’75
however, it seems that such a requirement was relatively easy to pass, as in the 
1930s the courts held that the devaluation of the national currency by 30% was 
sufficient to satisfy a substantial change criterion of the Störung der Geschäftsgrundlage 
doctrine.76 In one reported case a devaluation of only 13% was held to be enough.77 
this low threshold is hard to reconcile with the german approach to inflation, which 
required the inflation to be extraordinary to satisfy the above test. we cannot come 
up with any reasonable explanation of this outcome, as the nature and consequences 
of inflation and devaluation of the national currency are to a great extent similar, i.e. 
they lead to the distortion of the equivalence of exchange. the only difference is that 
in case of inflation it is the creditor who suffers the negative effects, since the debtor’s 
contractual burden is substantially alleviated, whereas depreciation in the value of 
the national currency primarily hits the debtor, because it makes performance of 
the foreign-currency obligation more burdensome.
It is interesting how far away from each other the german and russian doctrinal 
approaches may seem to be when it comes to the consequences of unforeseen 
changes of circumstances. whereas the german ideal is to maintain the contract as 
far as possible and simply adjust it to the changed situation (manifestation of the 
principle favor contractus),78 Art. 451(4) rCC permits adjustment only in exceptional 
circumstances, e.g. when termination of a contract results in damage to the parties 
far exceeding the costs necessary for the execution of the contract on revised terms. 
the position of the rCC is explained by the desire to avoid situations in which parties 
are bound together in a continuing hostile relationship and one or both of them are 
compelled to perform a contract on previously un-agreed terms.79 whatever the reasons 
for these divergent approaches might be, practical differences are rather overstated, 
as is evident from the fact that russian courts are equally ready to amend contracts.80 
Additionally, termination of a contract pursuant to Art. 451 rCC can be accompanied 
74  rgZ 100, 129.
75  Bgh NJw 1959, 2203.
76  rgZ 141, 212 (216); rgZ 163, 324 (333); rgZ 155, 137 (reported in unexpected Circumstances in 
European Contract Law, supra n. 23, at 222).
77  rgZ 147, 286 (289) (reported in unexpected Circumstances in European Contract Law, supra n. 23, at 222).
78  Bgh NJw 1984, 1746.
79  Брагинский М.И, Витрянский В.В. Договорное право. Книга первая: Общие положения [Braginsky M.I., 
Vitryansky V.V. Dogovornoe pravo. Kniga pervaya: Obshchie polozheniya [Mikhail I. Braginsky & Vasily 
V. Vitryansky, Contract Law. Book one: general Provisions]] 359 (statut 1998).
80  See supra n. 36.
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by various consequences determined by the court. these can include the payment 
of damages or the return to the other party of that which had been performed under 
the contract. In other words, some part of the obligations or even new obligations can 
bind the parties even after termination of the contract by the court.
the case law cited above gave the necessary guidelines to the german legislator, 
who in 2002 introduced a new provision into the BgB, i.e. § 313. this provision 
allows the judicial adaptation of a contract if the underlying circumstances (basis 
of a contract) have significantly changed, so that the parties would not have 
entered into the contract or would have entered into it on different terms, had they 
foreseen this change.81 Paragraph 313 embodies a rich tradition of german case law 
with its well-thought application of the Störung der Geschäftsgrundlage doctrine, 
requirements of unforeseeability and contract-saving bias.
on the face of it, the german approach to unforeseen change of circumstances 
seems to be similar to the russian one. Both of them require a sufficient degree of 
change, which shall not be foreseeable at the time of conclusion of the contract. 
however, the example of inflation and currency fluctuations shows that, in 
practice, the application of analogous categories of foreseeability, imputation of 
risk, exceptionalism may yield different results. russian courts have demonstrated 
obstinate reluctance to intervene in contractual relations, both in the aftermath of 
the default of 1998 and afterwards, whereas the german judiciary showed readiness 
to restore contractual equilibrium. Apart from the historical considerations described 
above, this could be partially explained by cultural traits. high scores for masculinity 
(66) and individualism (67) under the hofstede’s model predetermined a strong 
belief of the german society in the ideal of self-actualization and appreciation 
of achievement and success. this is, to a certain degree, counterbalanced by the 
high score in uncertainty avoidance (65), which on the fertile german soil with the 
philosophical heritage of kant, hegel and Fichte entailed a strong preference for 
deductive thinking. As a result, we can witness a well-developed and elaborate 
law system, designed to cover a broad spectrum of situations and protect against 
possible abuses. details create legal certainty, and this may explain why german 
judges and society as a whole were ready to accept and apply the Störung der 
Geschäftsgrundlage doctrine.
despite the fact that it was exactly the inflation and devaluation of the national 
currency which gave rise to the doctrine of hardship in germany, we believe it is 
rather improbable that german courts would be willing to amend contracts in 
cases of ‘normal’ or even ‘above-average’ currency fluctuations. It is important to 
81  Cf. Art. 6:258(1) of the dutch Civil Code (1992): ‘upon the demand of one of the parties, the court may 
modify the effects of a contract or it may set it aside, in whole or in part, on the basis of unforeseen 
circumstances of such a nature that the other party, according to standards of reasonableness and 
fairness, may not expect the contract to be maintained in unmodified form. the modification or 
setting aside may be given retroactive effect.’
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understand that the overwhelming inflation and currency depreciation which 
struck germany after the world war I were unprecedented. the radical turn made 
by Reichsgericht at the beginning of the 1920s was dictated by the urgent need 
of saving the national economy and preventing gross injustice. As stated above, 
currency fluctuations have become a part of the modern economic set-up and no 
party is protected against them. Nevertheless, the german approach will certainly 
fall into the category of ‘open’ regimes according to the criteria proposed by hondius 
& grigoleit.82 germany has a developed and tested doctrine specifically designed 
to address the issue of unexpected circumstances (Art. 313 BgB). In this respect, it 
stands along with russia. however, in practical terms, the german system seems to 
be more ‘open’ than the russian one.
4. French Law Approach: Contradiction and Individualism
4.1. Force majeure and Impossibility
the concept of force majeure in French law could be found in Art. 1148 of the 
Code civil83 [hereinafter CC] which states that ‘[t]here is no occasion for any damages 
where a debtor was prevented from transferring or from doing that to which he was 
bound . . . by reason of force majeure or of fortuitous event (cas fortuit).’84
Just like german law, French law following a roman tradition, in principle 
accepts the fault-based liability regime. this type of liability is generally applicable 
to the so-called obligations of means (obligations de moyens), whereas the debtor 
undertakes to ‘use all reasonable means to obtain the result, [so that] he is not bound 
to the result itself.’85 this type of obligation could be derived from Art. 1137 CC. At 
the same time, the rule of strict liability could be inferred from Art. 1147 therein, 
which provides that ‘[t]he debtor is required . . . to pay damages, whether for non-
performance of the obligation or for the delay in its performance . . . even though 
there is no bad faith on his part’ (emphasis added). this article refers to the so-called 
obligations of result (obligations de résultat), which entail an obligation to reach 
a particular result, e.g. deliver a thing or complete works.86
82  Ewoud hondius & hans C. grigoleit, general Comparative remarks: Converging tendencies, remaining 
differences and the unsolved Mystery of Adjustment, in unexpected Circumstances in European 
Contract Law, supra n. 23, at 643, 643.
83  the English translation of the Code Civil is available at <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/content/
download/1950/13681/.../Code_22.pdf> (accessed Jul. 26, 2015).
84  the terms ‘force majeure’ and ‘cas fortuity’ are used as synonyms.
85  Pauline rémy-Corlay, Structural Elements of the French Civil Code, in the Architecture of European 
Codes and Contract Law 33, 50 (stefan grundmann & Martin schauer, eds.) (kluwer Law International 
2006).
86  Philippe Malaurie et al., Les obligations 499 (5th ed., defrénois 2011); François terré et al., Les obligations 
582 (10th ed., dalloz 2009).
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For the purposes of this article, we do not need to conduct an in-depth analysis 
of the niceties in the distinction between obligations of means and result, as these 
two would mostly affect the allocation of the burden of proof.87 As we have shown 
with reference to the russian (no-fault liability in B2B relations) and german (fault-
based liability) legal systems, practical distinctions between fault and no-fault types 
of liability may be overstated. In both scenarios, in force majeure cases the debtor 
is excused from performing the primary obligation (specific performance), which 
becomes logically impossible, as well as the secondary obligation (payment of 
damages). In both scenarios, it is the debtor who has to prove the existence of an 
exception or the non-existence of fault. the only difference is that in fault-based 
systems, the court will assess the fault of the debtor (which is apparently missing 
in cases of force majeure), whereas in a strict liability regime, the court will analyse 
whether one of the exemptions to the strict liability of the debtor applies. we agree 
that, in effect, the ‘French system appears to be almost identical to the concept of 
strict liability, where the debtor is only freed from liability in damages if the non-
performance is excused.’88 this is even more so for situations of non-performance 
due to imposed trade restrictions, as such situations would usually fall under the 
‘obligations of result’ heading.
the regulation of consequences of force majeure under French law is similar to 
the russian and german one, namely, contractual obligations remain in effect, while 
claims for specific performance and damages are precluded. this result is driven by 
the principle of protection of contract, which as we will see later on, has been deeply 
incorporated into French contract law. In case of the debtor’s non-performance, the 
creditor acquires the right to apply to the court to have the contract terminated – he 
cannot, as a general rule, unilaterally terminate the contract extra-judicially (Art. 1184 
CC),89 unless otherwise agreed by the parties. this is different from russian law, which 
warrants such a termination in case of material breach (Art. 450 rCC) and german 
law, under which, as a general rule, a creditor may unilaterally terminate a contract 
if the debtor fails to perform it within a notice period set by the creditor – Nachfrist 
(§ 323(1) BgB).90 we believe that the application to the court may be welcome, and 
87  the lack of due care in obligations de moyens has to be proved by the creditor. whereas it is the debtor 
in obligations de résultat, who has to adduce evidence of a legitimate excuse for non-performance; 
the creditor must only prove that the required result was not achieved.
88  Brunner, supra n. 56, at 67.
89  In several decisions, though, the Cour de cassation (Court of Cassation) stated that ‘[t]he seriousness 
of a contracting party’s behavior may justify the unilateral termination of the agreement by other 
party.’ See yves-Marie Laithier, Comparative Reflections on the French Law of Remedies for Breach of 
Contract, in Comparative remedies for Breach of Contract 103, 119 (Nili Cohen & Ewan Mckendrick, 
eds.) (hart Pub. 2005); see also Malaurie et al., supra n. 86, at 469.
90  Notably, in case of impossibility (§ 275(1)–(3) BgB), german law (§ 326(5) BgB) releases the creditor 
of the need to specify an additional time (Nachfrist) for performance under the contract.
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the French approach is thus preferable in cases of temporal impossibility, where 
termination of the contract may be unwarranted.91
As we pointed out above, the impossibility to perform due to force majeure does 
not in itself lead to the termination of a contract; it exempts the debtor from liability 
for non-performance. since French law takes the position that an obligation to do 
the impossible is void (impossibilium nulla obligatio), initial impossibility shall render 
the contract void, with restitution and other ensuing consequences. According 
to Mckendrick, the same should hold true for subsequent impossibility when the 
breached obligation or obligations ‘are essential to the debtor’s performance as 
a whole.’92 we do not adhere to this view and believe that nullity of the contract 
does not automatically follow from a subsequent impossibility. this also seems to be 
the approach adopted by the French legal doctrine: ‘La stabilité des contrats a été 
pour notre jurisprudence le principe essentiel’ (‘the stability of contractual relations 
is a cornerstone of our case law’).93
In determining the grounds and consequences of impossibility, the French judiciary 
exercises a certain degree of flexibility. this discretion is however more limited than 
the one found in german law which, driven by the considerations of good faith, takes 
a nuanced approach. when deciding on the fate of the contract, French courts will 
usually take into account the practical consequences of force majeure (partial versus 
total non-performance) and the temporary nature of a supervening event (temporal 
versus permanent impossibility). In cases where the awarding of damages might 
be precluded by operation of Art. 1148 CC and termination could be a step too far, 
courts may reduce or vary the creditor’s obligations in order to balance the reduced 
obligation of the debtor. For instance, in one case decided in 1943 a claimant rented 
advertising space on an illuminated pillar at a railway station. however, in 1939, due 
to the war, the pillar lighting had to be switched off during the night. the court 
accepted that this was a force majeure event which made contractual performance 
partially impossible. As a result, the court lowered the rent by 20%.94
the flexibility of the French approach makes it rather similar to positions adopted 
by the russian and german legal systems when it comes to the termination of 
91  under French law, a party is not released from its contractual obligations and the contract is not 
terminated, when the impossibility is temporal in nature. In general, temporary impossibility warrants 
suspension of performance, until the impossibility ceases. See: John Bell et al., Principles of French 
Law 348 (2nd ed., oxford university Press 2008); Malaurie et al., supra n. 86, at 514. In each particular 
case in order to determine whether termination is justified, a court will analyze the seriousness the 
debtor’s non-performance. As a result, the court may order the suspension of the obligation, reduction 
in price (or other intermediate solution) or termination.
92  Barry Nicholas, Force Majeure in French Law, in Force Majeure and Frustration of Contract 21, 26 (Ewan 
Mckendrick, ed.) (2nd ed., Informa Law from routledge 2013).
93  terré et al., supra n. 86, at 588.
94  Nicholas, supra n. 92, at 27.
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a contract due to force majeure. Although at a closer look, the legal reasoning may 
differ. In russia, discussion will most probably relate to the issue of materiality, i.e. 
whether the breach of a contract effectively deprives the other party of what it could 
reasonably have expected when entering into the contract (Art. 450(2) rCC). german 
and French courts will look at the parties’ legitimate interests, considering, inter alia, 
whether impossibility is temporary or permanent, total or partial. they consider the 
issue of force majeure to be a high-wire balancing act. when impossibility due to 
force majeure is total and permanent, it is almost certain that a French court would 
license termination of the contract.
to prove the existence of force majeure under French law, the debtor has to 
show that contractual performance has become impossible, physically or legally, 
and not just more onerous. however, French courts might be willing to give a rather 
broad interpretation to force majeure and apply it in cases of frustration of purpose.95 
Apart from the impossibility of performing, a force majeure defence requires such 
elements as: (i) the irresistibility of an event; (ii) its unforeseeability; and (iii) the 
external character.96
Irresistibility highlights an unavoidable and insurmountable character of force 
majeure. As Le tourneau described it, ‘if the event was insurmountable, it can be 
imputed to no one. this is the application of common sense: no one can be obliged 
to perform what is impossible.’97 Irresistibility is closely linked with another element, 
namely the external nature of the event, which shall not be attributed to the parties 
or their agents. Imposition of trade restrictions would likely satisfy these criteria, as 
commercial parties cannot affect state policy, at least not directly.
If a party foresaw or should have foreseen an event preventing performance, it 
is assumed that such a party should have prepared itself for all the related negative 
consequences. the awareness should result in the terms of a contract, through, e.g., 
price adjustment mechanisms. Failure to do so falls under the commercial risk title. As 
we saw from the previous analysis, the notion of foreseeability is the most problematic 
one. unfortunately, there is not much more clarity under the French system when 
95  the case Dispot Merlin v. Robillard (Comm. rouen, August 28, 1843, upheld on appeal rouen, February 
9, 1844, d. 1845, 4) is a good example of that. the case concerned a contract regulating an express 
service by road between rouen and Paris. A couple of years after the conclusion of the contract, 
a railway connection was established between the above cities and the contract lost its original 
purpose. the judge in this case allowed the contract to be terminated by applying the doctrine of 
force majeure. See denis Philippe, France and Belgium, in Foreseen and unforeseen Circumstances 
(= 27 Bw-krant jaarboek) 156, 163 (Alex g. Castermans et al., eds.) (kluwer 2012), available at <http://
www.philippelaw.eu/uploaddirectory/userFiles/files/France%20and%20Belgium.pdf> (accessed 
Jul. 25, 2015).
96  Malaurie et al., supra n. 86, at 509; terré et al., supra n. 86, at 585.
97  Philippe le tourneau, La responsabilité civile 239 (3rd ed., dalloz 1982) (quoted in david r. rivkin, Lex 
Mercatoria and Force Majeure, in transnational rules in International Commercial Arbitration (= ICC 
Publication No. 480/4) 161, 176 (Emmanuel gaillard, ed.) (ICC Pub. 1993), available at <http://www.
trans-lex.org/116100> (accessed Jul. 26, 2015).
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it comes to this indispensable element of force majeure. despite the prevailing view 
that the requirement of foreseeability shall be scrutinized objectively, there is a trend 
(at least in academic circles) to take into account an element of relativity. thus, it is 
argued, the ‘courts must . . . base themselves on the average man and a standard 
of bon père de famille, as adapted to the defendant’s activities and to their level of 
specialization.’98 therefore, reasonable foreseeability may be overtaken by the specific 
foreseeability, enhanced in view of a party’s experience and specialization. It is more 
likely, that the subjectivity will play a role only when a party’s qualifications are above 
the average standard, not below it, at least in B2B transactions.
In practice, it might be immaterial which type of standard is applied. A lot more 
will depend on the way the courts define an ‘average’ or ‘reasonable’ man. should 
the foreseeability be absolute (so as ‘to escape the bounds of all human foresight’99), 
or is it enough for it to be relative (normally foreseeable)? For instance, in the 
decision of April 9, 1962, the French Conseil d’État (Council of state) found that 
since a previous flood had occurred 69 years before the one at issue, the flood was 
foreseeable.100 In another case, the court refused to consider an avalanche which 
struck Val-d’Isère in 1970 a force majeure event, due to the fact that another one 
was recorded around 50 years before.101 In the famous case concerning the robbery 
of a hotel,102 the court emphasized that unpredictability was a relative concept. the 
court found that an armed robbery was not unpredictable for a luxurious saint-
tropez hotel full of wealthy clients, even though it had never had any experience 
of being robbed. these examples show that the standard of an ‘average man’ in the 
eyes of the French judiciary is extremely high, making such a man almost a prophet, 
who knows the past and sees the future. the rigidity of the French stance makes it 
more like a russian approach than a german one. It seems that the mere possibility of 
a future event (e.g., an embargo) derived from the past occurrences, however remote 
and inconsiderable in number, might imply foreseeability. As the arbitral tribunal in 
one of the cases suggested, if a party ‘has or must have the slightest doubt about his 
ability to perform at the given time, he must make all necessary verifications before 
promising performance’103 (emphasis added).
98  geneviève Viney, 5 traité de droit civil. Les obligations. La responsabilité 398 (Jacques ghestin, ed.) 
(Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence 1988) (quoted in rivkin, supra n. 97, at 176–77).
99  Bell et al., supra n. 91, at 344.
100  Conseil d’État, 4 avril 1962, Ministre des Travaux publics c/ Société des Chais d’Armagnac, A.J.d.A. 1962, 
II, 592, concl. g. Braibant.
101  trib. adm. grenoble, 19 juin 1974, Dame Bosvy et autres c/ Ministre de l’Equipement et Commune de 
Val d’Isère, A.J.d.A. 1975, 194, note F. servoin, J.C.P. 1975, II, 17956, note Moderne.
102  Cass. 1e civ., 9 mars 1994, 1994 Bull. civ. I, No. 91, 70, at <http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.
do?idtexte=JurItEXt000007031881> (accessed Jul. 26, 2015).
103  ICC Case No. 12112, 34 y.B. Comm. Arb. 77 (2009).
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As we have pointed out above, when dealing with the russian approach, such 
strictness is morally unfounded and economically unjustified. It is wrong to punish 
someone for not doing the impossible, provided that a party could not have reasonably 
predicted a supervening event and acted in good faith. It also imposes a heavy burden 
on all parties in commercial transactions to negotiate and redistribute risks, whether 
probable or not, otherwise facing the negative consequences in the form of liability. 
this state of affairs may contravene the purpose of contract law, if we view it as 
a method of maximizing economic efficiency. It is true that each case is unique and 
there could be valid arguments to impute the blame on a non-performing party, e.g., 
when the party is a superior risk bearer. such is, for instance, a situation whenever 
the subjective factors (professional knowledge or particular awareness) indicate the 
subjective foreseeability of the event in question. In the words of guenter treitel, 
‘[t]he making of a contract in the face of an imminent prohibition and in the belief 
that performance will be affected by the prohibition comes very close to entering 
into the contract after the prohibition has already taken effect.’104 As it follows, trade 
prohibitions should be imminent, and not merely hypothetical.
4.2. Doctrine of imprévision: Dual Approach
the sternness of the French legal system is especially evident from the treatment 
of unforeseen change of circumstances, whenever private contracts are concerned. 
under French law there is a fine line drawn between physical or legal impossibility 
to perform (force majeure) and situations where performance is technically possible, 
but extremely difficult or onerous (imprévision). It is well known, and remains so up 
to this date, that the traditional French doctrine rejects the application of imprévision 
to private matters. Article 1134 CC states that the ‘[a]greements lawfully entered into 
take the place of the law for those who have made them.’ It is appealing to compare 
private agreements with laws binding the parties, as both create certainty and are 
supportive of the idea of economic freedom. thus, the judge amending the contract 
is considered to be ‘a source of instability and arbitrariness, particularly if it is related 
to an economic evaluation of the counter-obligations or contractual equilibrium.’105 
Mirroring this image, French courts persistently refused to amend contracts whose 
performance was affected by extraordinary inflation or depreciation in the value of 
national currency.106
the unwillingness of the French system to adopt the doctrine of imprévision could 
be explained by its historical and political background. the abuses of the ancien 
104  guenter h. treitel, Frustration and Force Majeure 508 (2nd ed., thomson; sweet & Maxwell 2004).
105  rodrigo M. uribe, the Effect of a Change of Circumstances on the Binding Force of Contracts: 
Comparative Perspectives (= 94 Ius Commune Europaeum) 45 (Intersentia 2011), available at <http://
dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/204792> (accessed Jul. 26, 2015).
106  depreciation of the pound in the thirties, depreciation of the ruble after 1971 (reported in unexpected 
Circumstances in European Contract Law, supra n. 23, at 249).
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régime and distrust of the courts have contributed to the vision of the revolutionaries 
that limited the courts’ role in the enforcement of statutes. Even the original function 
of the French Tribunal de cassation (now Cour de cassation) was to assist the legislature 
rather than to act as a court: ‘[I]ts task was to see that the courts did not deviate from 
the text of the laws and so encroach on the powers of the legislature.’107 Besides, in the 
aftermath of the paper money (assignats) crisis at the time of the French revolution, 
the CC introduced the principle of monetary nominalism in relation to loans. As is 
evident from the wording of Art. 1895 CC, French law of obligations operates with 
the category of nominal value, and not the real value, which takes into account 
depreciation and purchasing power. the principle of monetary nominalism is now 
considered to be applicable to all monetary claims.108
In addition, the readiness of the legislative branch to give a helping hand to those 
suffering injustice due to exceptional circumstances, has made a judicial response 
less needful.109 As german courts were taking up an active corrective role after the 
outbreak of the world wars, the French legislature provided for the termination 
of contracts if their performance were to cause hardship or loss greatly in excess 
of what could reasonably be expected at the time of the contract.110 during the 
time of war and post-war inflation, at least 9 statutes were passed ‘ameliorating the 
position of contracting parties severely affected by inflation.’111 It could be argued 
that the difference between the French and german approaches has its origins 
in the economic sphere, namely in the fact that the French economy has never 
seen such a dramatic and steep increase in inflation and currency depreciation as 
did the german economy. this of course is a valid argument. however, we believe 
that the divergence is primarily driven by unique French attitudes, political (strict 
adherence to the ideas of separation of powers), historical (vigilance towards the 
judicial authority) and cultural.
According to the hofstede’s index, France scores fairly high in power distance 
(68) and individualism (71). this explains that, on the one hand, one is only supposed 
to take care of oneself and one’s family; but on the other hand, people are still 
dependent on the central government, an impersonal power centre. therefore, 
107  James gordley & Arthur t. von Mehren, An Introduction to the Comparative study of Private Law: 
readings, Cases, Materials 99 (Cambridge university Press 2009).
108  hugh Beale et al., Cases, Materials and text on Contract Law 1158 (2nd ed., hart Pub. 2010).
109  It is possible to argue that inefficiency of the judiciary’s response was the cause of the legislator’s 
response. however, as pointed out by Posner & rosenfield, ‘there is no presumption that legislator 
seeks to enhance efficiency’ (Posner & rosenfield, supra n. 11, at 101).
110  See, e.g., Loi du 21 janvier 1918 dite failliot relative aux marches commerciaux conclus avant la 1ere 
guerre mondiale (Loi Failliot) (J.o., January 23, 1918, p. 837), which allowed termination of contracts 
concluded before August 1, 1918, if performance under such contracts became excessively onerous 
for one of the parties.
111  shirley renner, Inflation and the Enforcement of Contracts 15 (Edward Elgar Pub. 1999).
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under normal circumstances people shall take care of themselves, acting in self-
interested individualistic manner. they shall be responsible for future events, 
even if those are unforeseen. however, when the crisis strikes, the French might 
be expecting the central authority to intervene, as happened many times before, 
during and after the world wars. Just like russia with the score of 95, France ranks 
high in uncertainty avoidance (86). therefore, stability and a strong desire for laws, 
rules and regulations to structure life are highly valued in French society. this may 
seem to be in contradiction with the general negative attitude of the judiciary to 
establishing boundaries in cases where the performance of a contract is no longer 
viable or just. however, at a closer look, a strict rule of non-intervention by courts 
in the universe of privately agreed terms is the zenith of predictability and legal 
certainty, so cherished by the French people.
since the landmark decision in Canal de Craponne,112 the Cour de cassation has 
been steadfast in refusing the adaptation of contracts due to significant change of 
circumstances, including the steep rise of prices and currency devaluation. Even the 
world wars were not able to change this. For instance, in one of the cases the court dealt 
with a stock-rearing contract, entered into in 1910.113 under this contract, the farmer 
was required to return to the proprietor the herd of equal value, that value being fixed 
in the contract. As a result of the post-war monetary depreciation, the real value of the 
herd increased when compared to the fixed contractual amount. the attempt by the 
proprietor to attain a proportion of the added value was abruptly cut off by the Cour de 
cassation, which held that no equitable consideration allows courts to amend contract. 
the arguments, based on Arts. 1134 and 1135 CC, which provide that contracts have to 
be performed in good faith and in accordance with equity, were rejected as referring to 
the interpretation of contracts and a duty of loyalty in the execution of contracts, rather 
than to their readjustment by the judiciary. In a more recent case, the Cour de cassation 
clearly stated that even when the rule of Art. 1134 allows the judge to sanction abuse 
of contractual rights, the provision does not grant him the right to ‘alter the substance 
of the terms validly agreed upon by the parties.’114
112  the decision dates back to 1876 and concerns a dispute between the owners of the canal built in the 
16th century and the farmers who were the beneficiaries of the agreement, which allowed them to 
use water from the canal for irrigation purposes. By the 19th century the fixed fee paid by the farmers 
has become inadequate, with management costs exceeding such an amount. despite this fact, the 
Cour de Cassation refused to revise the contract price, arguing that ‘it was not open to the courts, 
however equitable their decision might like to be, to take into consideration the lapse of time and 
circumstances in order to modify an agreement, thereby substituting new terms for those which had 
been freely agreed upon by the parties’ (quoted in Eva steiner, French Law: A Comparative Approach 
335 (oxford university Press 2010)).
113  Cass. civ., 6 juin 1921, d. 1921, I, 73, s. 1921, I, 193. the case is discussed in Beale et al., supra n. 108, 
at 1132–33.
114  uribe, supra n. 105, at 45 (describing the case Cass. com., 10 juillet 2007, r.d.C. 2007, 1107, note 
d. Mazeaud).
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Interestingly, the approach of the French judiciary to unforeseen change 
of circumstances has never been unified. In the 1920s, in order to alleviate the 
hardships caused by inflation, the lower courts began manipulating the remedy 
of damages, since it would usually be outside the scope of the revision by the 
Cour de cassation. they considered that ‘[w]here a change in the value of goods 
or services could be attributed to a change in the value of money, a buyer was 
supposed not to have suffered substantial damage.’115 the unease with which French 
courts were applying an unqualified one-size-fits-all vision is also evident from the 
numerous judgments allowing for contract revision and later reversed by the Cour 
de cassation.
As opposed to the area of private law and jurisprudence of the Cour de cassation, 
the Conseil d’État, the highest administrative court, embraced the doctrine of 
imprévision as early as in the 1910s.116 In the famous Gaz de Bourdeaux case, the Conseil 
d’État allowed the renegotiation of the contract for the gas and electricity supply, 
entered into between a private contractor and the city of Bourdeaux. the court 
considered the fact that, due to an unexpected rise in coal prices during the war 
time, contractual performance under the original conditions would be disastrous 
for the supplier. In reaching its decision, the Conseil d’État was guided by the general 
interest of the public, which required the continuation of the company services.117 to 
address the injustice arising out of an unexpected change of circumstances, a judge 
would invite the parties to renegotiate the agreement. Failure to do so might result in 
a compensation (indemnité d’imprévision), awarded for the purpose of restoring the 
economic equilibrium. thus, a contract itself remains unaltered and in force, unless 
the economic imbalance becomes permanent, in which case it can be terminated 
on the ground of force majeure.
For the purposes of this article we are not going to discuss the legal nature of 
indemnité d’imprévision or the limited scope of its application by the administrative 
courts. Instead, we would agree with those scholars who believe that the divergent 
approach of French administrative and private law has no compelling reasoning.118 
some authors believe that imprévision is characteristically an administrative law 
doctrine, which cannot be understood in the light of private law theories.119 this is 
115  Janwillem oosterhuis, Unexpected Circumstances Arising from World War I and Its Aftermath: ‘Open’ 
versus ‘Closed’ Legal Systems, 7(2) Erasmus L. rev. 73 (2014), available at <http://www.elevenjournals.
com/tijdschrift/ELr/2014/2/ELr_2210-2671_2014_007_002_003.pdf> (accessed Jul. 26, 2015). 
doi:10.5553/ELr.000018
116  French law is to a certain extent exceptional for having two distinct legal systems, one of private 
and one of public law.
117  Conseil d’État, 30 mars 1916, Compagnie générale d’éclairage de Bordeaux c/ Ville de Bordeaux, d. 
1916, III, 25, concl. Chardenet.
118  See, e.g.: uribe, supra n. 105, at 52; Beale et al., supra n. 108, at 1130.
119  rené david & henry P. de Vries, the French Legal system 65 (oceana Pub. 1958).
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mainly explained by the nature and importance of public services, and the possible 
consequences of a failure to perform such services. however, in today’s interdependent 
world, the private sector has no less effect on the economic stability and societal well-
being, than the public one. A good example of that was given by the recent economic 
crises, which have shown, as clearly as they could, that the public and private interests 
are mixed and that the failure of the private ‘too-big-to-fail’ companies could have 
a significant economic impact, affecting a large number of people.
the artificial character of a private-public distinction, when it comes to 
contractual relations and unforeseen change of circumstances, and the need to 
embrace the doctrine of imprévision in private matters have led to various initiatives 
aimed at modernizing the French law of obligations. the most famous of the reform 
projects are the Avant-projet Catala, prepared by the group of scholars under the 
chairmanship of Professor Pierre Catala and presented to the French Ministry of 
Justice in 2005 and the Projet Terré, prepared by the working group led by Professor 
François terré and published in 2009.
the most recent Projet d’Ordonnance related to the reform of French civil law 
was published by the Ministry of Justice on February 25, 2015.120 Article 1196 of the 
Projet effectively introduces the notion of hardship / imprévision into French private 
law. It provides that in case the unforeseen change of circumstances has made the 
execution of a contract excessively onerous for a party which did not assume such 
a risk, the party can ask for a contract renegotiation. If the other party refuses to 
conduct negotiations or if negotiations fail, parties can jointly ask a judge to adapt the 
contract. If this does not work, one party may ask the judge to terminate the contract, 
on the date and conditions determined by him. thus, as we see from the text of the 
article, a judge does not have the power to adapt the contract, unless both parties 
agree on that, which is hardly possible, taking into account the conflicting nature 
of their relations. this limited role given to the court is in line with the traditional 
caution of French society towards the judiciary, as noted above. Nevertheless, the 
power to terminate a contract ‘at a date and on terms to be fixed’ might, in theory, 
compensate for the lack of revision competence.
we agree with Alain ghozi that contracts are by their nature judicial acts looking 
into the future and therefore, they shall themselves provide for answers to the 
difficulties arising in the future.121 In any case, mutually agreed compromises are 
always preferable to court-imposed solutions. French courts seem to have embraced 
120  Ministère de la justice, Projet d’Ordonnance n° du portant réforme du droit des contrats, du régime 
général et de la preuve des obligations, <http://www.justice.gouv.fr/publication/j21_projet_ord_
reforme_contrats_2015.pdf> (accessed Jul. 26, 2015).
121  Alain ghozi, The Effects of Contracts; Contractual Interpretation and Contractual Classification (articles 
1134 to 1143), in reforming the French Law of obligations. Comparative reflections on the Avant-
projet de reforme du droit obligations et de la prescription (‘the Avant-projet Catala’) 543, 547 (John 
Cartwright et al., eds.) (hart Pub. 2009).
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this vision like no other court. In comparison to the legal systems referred to above, 
the French approach to force majeure and unforeseen change of circumstances is 
the most rigorous one. up to this date, the Cour de cassation has been persistent 
in refusing contract adaptation due to supervening events, making contractual 
performance excessively burdensome or even ruinous to one of the parties. It is 
very unlikely that steep inflation or currency fluctuations will ever be regarded as 
a reason for the revision or termination of a contract. they were not considered 
a good enough reason during, and in the aftermath of, the world wars, accordingly 
they will not be accepted as such in times of peace. the same negative attitude to 
court intervention holds true for issues of force majeure, which under French law 
sets a high bar for the foreseeability requirement. It seems that any intrusion by the 
courts into the sanctity of private relations is viewed as a source of insecurity and 
economic instability. As opposed to the regimes found in russian and german law, 
the French legal system is manifestly a ‘closed’ one.
5. Conclusion
the purpose of law is always two-fold. on the one hand, it stimulates economic 
growth, insures stable societal development and the protection of human rights. 
on the other, it is often reactive to all sorts of instability. It so happens that modern 
times have been characterized by rising tensions, both political and economic. 
In such a situation, the role of legal norms and the judiciary obtains increased 
importance.
In the pages above, we have analysed how the legal systems of russia, germany 
and France have reacted to cases of trade restrictions and currency depreciation, 
when contractual performance becomes impossible (force majeure) or extremely 
burdensome (change of circumstances). to make the comparison more relatable, 
we referred to the recent events, including the trade restrictions imposed by the 
russian Federation on certain food products coming from the usA, the Eu, Japan, 
and some other countries. the imposition of the embargo coincided with the 
devaluation of the rouble, caused by various macroeconomic reasons. whereas the 
former might have become an obstacle to international trade as delivery of various 
goods became illegal, the latter affected contracts concluded in foreign currency, 
making performance under such contracts more onerous, at least for one of the 
parties involved.
our analysis has been necessarily broad. In order to give a better vision of the 
current state of affairs related to impossibility and impracticability, we reviewed 
historical and cultural backgrounds, and briefly touched upon the economic 
considerations. Ironically, despite the fact that the concepts discussed have been 
known in russia, germany and France for a reasonably long time, there still seems 
to be confusion among practicing lawyers when it comes to their application in 
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practice. the reason for that might naturally lie in the nature of force majeure and 
unforeseen change of circumstances. they both affect contractual equilibrium and 
distort a normal or foreseeable course of contract execution. Another explanation 
may stem from the poorly drafted legal provisions or contradictory case law. In this 
respect, we hope that our article sheds some light on the existing regulations of 
these distinct, but closely connected notions.
when it comes to force majeure, all three legal systems recognize that a party 
should not bear responsibility for non-performance, if performance became 
impossible (physically or legally) due to unforeseeable, insurmountable and external 
events. despite the perceived similarity, practical application of force majeure 
may vary depending on the judicial interpretation of the terms ‘foreseeability’ 
and ‘unavoidability.’ this would be determined by historical, cultural and political 
considerations. some scholars have divided all legal systems into two categories, the 
so called ‘open’ and ‘closed’ regimes.122 the former are characterized by the existence 
of a general doctrine addressing unexpected circumstances and the mechanism of 
contract adjustment as a remedy, while the latter lacks one of the two. this distinction 
is purely doctrinal and in practice ‘open’ systems might turn out to be rather ‘closed.’ 
we believe that the same division holds true for the application of the impossibility 
defence, at least when we consider russian, german and French approaches to force 
majeure. Courts in russia and France have set a rather high bar for the requirement 
of unforeseeability, so whenever a similar event happened in the past, it can be 
argued that all future incidents would in fact be foreseeable. Foreseeability also plays 
a central role in the treatment of an unforeseen change of circumstances.
Another important aspect of force majeure is the effect it has on the fate of 
the contract. turning back to economic and moral considerations, we argue that 
impossibility shall not automatically lead to the termination of a contract and 
contractual obligations. In this respect, both French and german approaches support 
this view. the rCC (Arts. 416 and 417) does not provide a clear answer to the question 
whether temporal or partial impossibility terminates contractual relations. Moreover, 
recent amendments to Art. 417 have created additional complications, as contractual 
obligations terminated due to the adoption of a state act may well be restored 
when such an act is held void or is repealed later on. In our view, it is only when 
impossibility is permanent and total that the automatic termination may be justified. 
temporal and partial impossibility, as is usually the case with trade restrictions, 
shall not lead to such grave consequences. Late performance causes default, not 
impossibility. In some situations, however, temporal impossibility can reasonably be 
equated to permanent, and partial impossibility – to total, of course not in a strict 
sense, but rather in the result achieved. this shall be determined from the position of 
the creditor, taking into account all relevant factors, such as urgency of performance, 
122  unexpected Circumstances in European Contract Law, supra n. 23.
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potential losses for the creditor, etc. In our view a case-by-case approach to the issue 
of termination of contractual obligations is well justified.
we agree that, at least in business relations, it is the role of the parties to 
contractually allocate risks related to future events capable of changing the balance 
of loss and profit in line with the economics of the transaction. After all, the parties 
are usually in a better position to assess the probability that the risk will materialize 
and the magnitude of the loss thereof, which richard Posner referred to as risk-
appraisal costs.123 however, it is not always possible for the parties to predict all future 
events, especially in case of long-term contracts. Inability to foresee the future is 
exacerbated by the lack of access to all the relevant information and the optimistic 
bias inherent in human behaviour.124
obligations have moral and economic parameters. In some situations, contractual 
adjustment could be economically justified, as the need to negotiate specific 
provisions dealing with such consequences might substantially increase transaction 
costs, when taken at the global or nationwide scale. there is also no empirical 
evidence to suggest that a narrowly construed judicial intervention in situations 
of drastic currency fluctuations or trade restrictions can destabilize the economy 
or undermine the stability of contracts. Besides, considerations of justice, fairness, 
good faith, public interest and others may require interference by the court. this is 
what happened in germany in the 1920s and 1930s, when the country was suffering 
from extreme inflation and the national currency was heavily depreciated. german 
courts reacted by revising contracts and adjusting rental payments and purchase 
prices. to the contrary, neither russian nor French judiciary was ready to interfere in 
contractual relations, when faced with steep currency fluctuations. these divergent 
approaches cannot be explained by reference to the liability regimes (fault versus 
no-fault liability), as one might expect. Instead, we believe that the main reasons 
are rather historical and cultural, as shown by hofstede’s cultural dimensions theory 
that we used in our analyses.
It took the unprecedented shocks of the world war I to make the german 
approach more lenient and willing to accept the hardship defence. It is also true that 
deductive thinking, deeply rooted in the german tradition, might have contributed 
to the willingness of the judiciary to interfere, without being afraid of creating 
imbalance and causing legal uncertainty. russia and France have not encountered 
such unrivalled circumstances. Even if they had done, it is rather improbable that 
their approach would have dramatically changed. this is so because of political 
and cultural peculiarities. First, unlike force majeure, which always targets a limited 
number of contractual relations, acceptance of hardship to currency depreciation 
123  Posner & rosenfield, supra n. 11, at 91.
124  For more on cognitive biases, see Behavioral Law and Economics (Cass r. sunstein, ed.) (Cambridge 
university Press 2000).
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would likely have a broader, countrywide effect. the judiciary in France and russia 
were simply not prepared to make this far-reaching and to a certain extent, political 
move, unlike in germany. second, due to historical reasons, French courts were 
considered to be a source of instability. this is not necessarily so nowadays. But 
the negative attitude to uncertainty, inherent in French and russian culture still 
makes a reserved approach of their courts rather logical. After all, what can be more 
predictable and certain than the lack of any intervention whatsoever?
In any event, legal regimes of force majeure and unforeseen change of 
circumstances operate very restrictively in all jurisdictions studied. this is the 
result of the high value and importance attributed to the ancient doctrine of pacta 
sunt servanda. therefore, whichever law is applicable to a particular transaction in 
question, especially for international contracts, it might be advisable to provide for 
specific contractual mechanisms addressing issues of liability and release therefrom, 
should performance become impossible, economically impractical or unfairly 
imbalanced. such mechanisms could include renegotiation, hardship, indexation, 
force majeure and other clauses. otherwise parties risk suffering harsh consequences, 
even in the absence of their fault.
References
Aksoy, hüseyin C. Impossibility in Modern Private Law: A Comparative study of 
german, swiss and turkish Laws and the unification Instruments 11, 172 (springer 
2014).
Beale, hugh, et al. Cases, Materials and text on Contract Law 1130, 1132–33, 1158 
(2nd ed., hart Pub. 2010).
Behavioral Law and Economics (Cass r. sunstein, ed.) (Cambridge university 
Press 2000).
Bell, John, et al. Principles of French Law 344, 348 (2nd ed., oxford university 
Press 2008).
Brunner, Christoph. Force Majeure and hardship under general Contract 
Principles: Exemption for Non-Performance in International Arbitration 67, 251–52 
(kluwer Law International 2009).
das neue schuldrecht 108 (Barbara dauner-Lieb et. al., eds.) (C.F. Müller 2002).
david, rené, & Vries, henry P. de. the French Legal system 65 (oceana Pub. 1958).
dawson, John P. Effects of Inflation on Private Contracts: Germany, 1914–1924, 
33(2) Mich. L. rev. 191 (1934).
Fikentscher, wolfgang, & heinemann, Andreas. schuldrecht § 27, 188, 191, 197, 
200, 320 (10th ed., de gruyter 2006).
Firoozmand, Mahmoud r. Changed Circumstances and Immutability of Contract: 
A Comparative Analysis of Force Majeure and Related Doctrines, 8(2) Bus. L. Int’l 171 
(2007).
ILYA KOKORIN, JEROEN VAN DER WEIDE 81
ghozi, Alain. The Effects of Contracts; Contractual Interpretation and Contractual 
Classification (articles 1134 to 1143), in reforming the French Law of obligations. 
Comparative reflections on the Avant-projet de reforme du droit obligations et 
de la prescription (‘the Avant-projet Catala’) 543, 547 (John Cartwright et al., eds.) 
(hart Pub. 2009).
gordley, James, & Mehren, Arthur t. von. An Introduction to the Comparative study 
of Private Law: readings, Cases, Materials 99 (Cambridge university Press 2009).
hofstede, geert, et al. Cultures and organizations: software of the Mind (3rd ed., 
Mcgraw-hill 2010).
Laithier, yves-Marie. Comparative Reflections on the French Law of Remedies for 
Breach of Contract, in Comparative remedies for Breach of Contract 103, 119 (Nili 
Cohen & Ewan Mckendrick, eds.) (hart Pub. 2005).
Luhmann, Niklas. risk: A sociological theory 190 (rhodes Barret, trans.) (de 
gruyter 1993).
Malaurie, Philippe, et al. Les obligations 469, 499, 509, 514 (5th ed., defrénois 
2011).
Markesinis, Basil s., et al. the german Law of Contract: A Comparative treatise 
407, 413, 485 (2nd ed., hart Pub. 2006).
Nicholas, Barry. Force Majeure in French Law, in Force Majeure and Frustration of 
Contract 21, 26–27 (Ewan Mckendrick, ed.) (2nd ed., Informa Law from routledge 2013).
Posner, richard A., & rosenfield, Andrew M. Impossibility and Related Doctrines in 
Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6(1) J. Legal stud. 83, 88, 91, 101 (1977).
rémy-Corlay, Pauline. Structural Elements of the French Civil Code, in the 
Architecture of European Codes and Contract Law 33, 50 (stefan grundmann & 
Martin schauer, eds.) (kluwer Law International 2006).
renner, shirley. Inflation and the Enforcement of Contracts 15 (Edward Elgar 
Pub. 1999).
ridder, Philip, & weller, Marc-Philippe. Unforeseen Circumstances, Hardship, 
Impossibility and Force Majeure under German Contract Law, 22 European review of 
Private Law 371, 373 (2014).
schlechtriem & schwenzer: Commentary on the uN Convention on the 
International sale of goods (CIsg) 1071 (Ingeborg schwenzer, ed.) (3rd ed., oxford 
university Press 2010).
schlechtriem, Peter. schuldrecht: Allgemeiner teil 151 (Mohr siebeck 2003).
steiner, Eva. French Law: A Comparative Approach 335 (oxford university Press 
2010).
terré, François, et al. Les obligations 582, 585, 588 (10th ed., dalloz 2009).
The Effects of Currency Fluctuations on the Economy, Investopedia (Aug. 8, 2013), 
<http://www.investopedia.com/articles/forex/080613/effects-currency-fluctuations-
economy.asp> (accessed Jul. 26, 2015).
tourneau, Philippe le. La responsabilité civile 239 (3rd ed., dalloz 1982).
RUSSIAN LAW JOURNAL    Volume III (2015) Issue 3 82
treitel, guenter h. Frustration and Force Majeure 508 (2nd ed., thomson; sweet & 
Maxwell 2004).
unexpected Circumstances in European Contract Law 3, 11, 49, 58, 222, 249, 643 
(Ewoud hondius & hans C. grigoleit, eds.) (Cambridge university Press 2011).
Viney, geneviève. 5 traité de droit civil. Les obligations. La responsabilité 398 
(Jacques ghestin, ed.) (Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence 1988).
Zimmermann, reinhard. the Law of obligations: roman Foundations of the 
Civilian tradition 579 (Clarendon Press 1996).
Брагинский М.И, Витрянский В.В. Договорное право. Книга первая: Общие 
положения [Braginsky M.I., Vitryansky V.V. dogovornoe pravo. kniga pervaya: 
obshchie polozheniya [Mikhail I. Braginsky & Vasily V. Vitryansky, Contract Law. Book 
one: general Provisions]] 359 (statut 1998).
Брагинский М.И, Витрянский В.В. Договорное право. Книга пятая. В двух 
томах. Т. 1 [Braginsky M.I., Vitryansky V.V. Dogovornoe pravo. Kniga pyataya. V dvukh 
tomakh. T. 1 [Mikhail I. Braginsky & Vasily V. Vitryansky, Contract Law. 1 Book Five]] 
(statut 2006).
Николюкин С.В. Основания оcвобождения от ответственности в практике 
международного коммерческого арбитража // Право и экономика. 2009. № 5. 
C. 96–101 [Nikolyukin s.V. Osnovaniya osvobozhdeniya ot otvetstvennosti v praktike 
mezhdunarodnogo kommercheskogo arbitrazha // Pravo i ekonomika. 2009. No. 5. 
s. 96–101 [stanislav V. Nikolyukin, Grounds for Release from Liability in Case Law of 
International Commercial Arbitration, 2009(5) Law and Economics 96–101]].
Information about the authors
Ilya Kokorin (St. Petersburg, Russia) – Attorney-at-Law, Partner at Buzko Kokorin 
Law Firm, LL.M. (Central European university, Leiden Law school) (9/2 Pulkovskaya 
str., st. Petersburg, 196158, russia; e-mail: ilya.kokorin@buzkokokorin.com).
Jeroen van der Weide (Leiden, The Netherlands) – Associate Professor of 
Private Law at Institute for Private Law, Leiden Law school (kamerlingh onnes 
gebouw, steenschuur 25, office No. C207, Leiden, 2311 Es, the Netherlands; e-mail: 
j.a.van.der.weide@law.leidenuniv.nl).
